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I.  Introduction 
 The post-World War II era witnessed long periods of economic growth around the globe and 
market-based economic forces are behind most of the successes.  By various tangible measures the 
most impressive growth and transformations took place in Asia.  First, the “Four Tigers”—Republic 
of Korea (Korea hereafter), Taiwan, province of China (Taiwan hereafter), Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China (Hong Kong hereafter) and Singapore—along with Japan 
showcased earlier episodes of ‘economic miracles’ between the 1960s and 1980s.  In the case of 
Taiwan and Korea, their per capita GDP, in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, went from 916 
and 845 international dollars in 1950, similar to those of many African countries and only 13% of 
that of the UK and France, to similar levels to the U.K. and France in 2010 (Table 1).1  Assuming 
growth rates in per capita GDP persist, it will take less than 10 years before they catch up to the US.  
Second, the size of China’s economy went from less than 10% of that of the US in 1980 to 
the second largest economy and two thirds of the US (in PPP terms) at the end of 2010.  In PPP 
terms, China’s economy will surpass the US and become the largest in the world in 2016 according 
to IMF’s World Economic Outlook (April 2011), and will have double the US GDP around 2035 as 
long as it maintains an average growth rate that is at least twice as high as that of the US.  
Transiting from a central-planning to a (partially) market-based economy, China’s rise as a world 
power, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in the process, represents one of the 
greatest economic achievements in history.  India, currently the fourth largest economy in the world 
in PPP terms, has also been quite successful in terms of economic growth during the past two 
decades, and so have other southern and south-eastern Asian countries such as Vietnam.  Most 
people would agree that Asia, and in particular, China and India, will continue to be the main 
engine for global economic growth in the foreseeable future.  
                                                 
1 The GDP of Korea and Taiwan, in PPP terms, are also among the largest twenty economies in the world as of 2010. 
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Economists have long argued that a key driver for long-run economic growth is efficient 
institutions that facilitate business transactions (e.g., Coase, 1960; North and Thomas, 1973; 
Williamson, 1979).  Much of institutional economics developed over the past two decades has 
emphasized the role of two types of formal institutions.  First, pioneered by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998; LLSV hereafter), the law and finance literature posits 
that a strong legal system that enforces contracts and resolves disputes is important for finance and 
growth.  Second, a developed financial system, and in particular, financial markets and a banking 
sector, are vital sources of external financing to fund firm growth.2  In earlier work (Allen, Qian, 
and Qian (AQQ), 2005), we show that China provides a significant counterexample to the existing 
literature.  During China’s transformation (1980-2010), neither its legal nor financial systems were 
well developed and the government was regarded as autocratic and corrupt, and yet its economy 
grew at the fastest pace in the world.  Other research has shown that, similar to China, the legal 
system plays a very limited role in finance and commerce in other successful Asian economies 
including Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam and Japan.  Our other work finds that despite the English 
common-law origin and a British-style judicial system, formal legal and financial institutions are of 
limited use in India (Allen, Chakrabarti, De, Qian, and Qian (ACDQQ), 2011).  Even in developed 
countries such as the UK and Germany, where financial markets and formal legal and financial 
institutions were first developed, it is debatable about the importance of the role of the law and legal 
system during their early stages of economic development.     
The conventional wisdom would characterize the economic performance in China as 
‘successful despite the lack of Western-style institutions.’  By contrast, we argue in this paper that 
China has done well because of this lack of Western-style institutions – in that conducting business 
                                                 
2 The finance and growth literature suggests that the development of stock markets and banks contributes to a country’s 
economic growth (e.g., McKinnon 1973; King and Levine 1993; Levine and Zervos 1998). Researchers have 
strengthened this view with evidence at the industry and firm levels, that the access to market and bank finance has a 
positive and causal impact on firm growth (e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan 1996; Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
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outside the legal system in fast-growing economies, such as the current economies of China and 
India and the economies of Taiwan and Korea in the 1960s through 1980s, can be superior to using 
the law as the basis for finance and commerce.  In China and India, state-owned enterprises and 
publicly listed firms have much easier access to legal institutions and banks and financial markets 
than non-state, non-listed firms in both countries.  These non-state, non-listed firms conduct 
business outside the legal system and do not rely on financial markets or banks for most of their 
financing needs.  Instead, they use methods based on reputation, relationships and trust to settle 
disputes and induce good behaviors and rely on alternative financing channels such as trade credits 
and funds from family and friends to finance their growth.  In both countries and especially in 
China, it is the non-state, non-listed firms that provide most of the economic growth and employ 
most of the labor force.  To a large degree, similar “alternative institutions” are also behind the 
success of other Asian economies, and have played an important part in other developed countries 
such as the UK and Germany, at least during early stages of their growth. 
We develop our main theses by comparing and contrasting two different sets of systems.  In 
one system, observed in developed and democratic countries such as the US, there is a commitment 
to use the law as the basis for finance and commerce, with legal institutions serving as the ultimate 
source for resolving disputes and enforcing contracts.  Any fundamental change to the law must be 
approved by the legislature and electorate (“top-down” approach to deal with changes).  In the other 
system, with China providing the leading example, there is no clear definition of private property 
rights in the constitution.  In place of the law, nonlegal mechanisms are the norm for conducting 
business, and alternative institutions constantly adapt to changes in the economy while competition 
ensures the most efficient mechanism prevails (“bottom-up” approach).  
Despite well-know advantages, there are problems in using the law and legal system as the 
basis for finance and commerce, and these problems can become impediments for innovations and 
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growth.  A central concept in the legal paradigm is the protection of private property rights and one 
of the intensely debated topics is intellectual property rights including patents and copyrights.  The 
practice of enforcing such rights by courts is much more vigilant in developed countries than in 
developing countries.  An extensive literature has found mixed results on the relationship between 
patent/copyright protection and the pace of innovations.  On the one hand, exclusive property rights 
provide strong incentives for innovations and do lead to more innovations in some industries such 
as chemicals and pharmaceuticals.  On the other hand, such a positive relationship is not observed 
in most other industries; instead, excessive protection deters competition, which is another 
important factor in spurring innovations.  One problem with the litigation systems is that they 
induce rent-seeking behaviors by vested interest groups.  With abundant resources they can 
undertake various measures and use the legal system to block competition and innovations from 
others, and this type of behavior slows down growth and reduces social welfare.  
Another problem of using the law is limited capacity and fixed costs associated with 
revising the law as required by changes in the economic environment.  In a democracy, the 
legislature must approve any revisions in the law before companies and investors can implement 
new technologies or innovations.  However, in any given period politicians have limited time to 
devote to one area of the law, implying a fixed cost in revising the law.  A good example illustrating 
such limited capacity is the reform of the US payments system.  At the beginning of the twenty-first 
century the US had a nineteenth century payments system, relying mostly on paper checks, and 
significantly lagging behind other developed nations.  Checks had to be physically transported from 
where they were deposited to a central operations center, then to the clearer and then back to the 
banks they were drawn on.  Despite repeated calls for changes from the banks and businesses, the 
US Congress was not interested in solving this seemingly simple yet costly problem, until the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which grounded commercial flights and halt the check clearing 
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process.   Congress passed the Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act and it became effective in 
October 2003.  This allows electronic images to be a substitute for the original checks. 
The examples on legal and alternative institutions motivate our analysis on the comparison 
of the system based on rule of law and legal institutions vs. the system relying on alternative, 
nonlegal institutions.  Using the law and the legal system has many important advantages.  The 
legal system of a democracy ideally allows equal and full access by all and fairness in trials and 
settlements.  With powerful enforcement mechanisms including civil and criminal penalties, 
disputing individuals, firms and organizations have strong incentives to follow the resolutions 
backed by courts and the government.  This in turn provides long-term stability on how things 
should be done in practice.  By using the entire legal system, the marginal costs for handling an 
additional case (e.g., enforcing similar types of contracts or resolving disputes) can be much lower 
and this improves overall efficiency. 
However, there are at least two significant disadvantages in using the law and legal 
institutions.  First, research on political economy factors – in particular, work by Rajan and Zingales 
(2003a; 2003b) – argues that rent-seeking behaviors by vested interest groups can turn the legal 
system, a monopolist institution, into barriers to change.  We expect these problems to be much 
more severe in developing countries, where the costs of building institutions are enormous.  We 
argue that one way to solve this problem is not to use the law as the basis for finance and commerce 
but instead to use alternative institutions.  Second, as shown by the example of reforming the US 
payment system, the capacity of the legal system and legislature can impose significant fixed costs 
in revising the law and thus delaying the pace of innovations.  These fixed costs can further increase 
if the people in charge of revising the law (e.g., politicians and judges) lack expertise in business 
transactions.  Further, interest groups with more resources may receive more protection than 
individuals, and this asymmetric protection system induces even more rent-seeking behaviors and 
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further deters innovations. 
In fast growing economies and during early stages of economic development, characterized 
by frequent, fundamental changes in the economic environment, the disadvantages of using the 
legal system can overshadow its advantages.  Thus, conducting business without using the law and 
legal system, as witnessed in China and other Asian economies, can be a superior model.  In 
addition to minimizing the political economy costs associated with legal institutions, using 
alternative mechanisms is advantageous in that such mechanisms can adapt and change much more 
quickly than the law.  In particular, competition among different networks and institutions can 
ensure the most efficient mechanism prevails, and it is not necessary to persuade the legislature and 
the electorate that the law needs to be revised when circumstances change.  
There are limitations to alternative mechanisms.  By design these mechanisms often exist 
within a network (or networks) of firms and investors and may be inaccessible to outsiders.  With 
frequent changes and limited enforcement—since penalties cannot be imposed with authority, these 
systems can generate instability and hence weak long-term incentives.  While in a fast-growing 
economy profit-sharing in the long run and reputation-based mechanisms can ensure “good” 
(cooperative) behaviors, these mechanisms may be insufficient to induce such behaviors in 
environments with limited future profits.  On the other hand, in such static environments with 
infrequent changes to the fundamentals (e.g., a developed economy with low and predictable 
growth rates), the fixed costs of using the legal system are relatively small; hence the law and legal 
system can be superior to the alternative mechanisms.  
We conclude that in fast-growing economies and during early stages of economic growth, 
efficient alternative institutions are the main driver for finance, commerce and growth.  Therefore, 
one of our main policy implications is that in emerging economies, efficient nonlegal governance 
mechanisms and financial institutions should be encouraged and developed alongside the 
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development of formal legal and financial institutions and markets.  In more static environments 
with low and predictable growth, legal institutions can play a more important role in supporting 
finance and commerce.  In these environments, however, it is still important to have a viable 
alternative system as the competition among different types of institutions is the key to sustaining 
long-term growth.  In particular, competition from alternative institutions can exert positive impact 
on the further development of legal institutions, so that they are less likely to be captured by interest 
groups and become more efficient in adapting to changes.     
We also provide testable predictions and contrast them with other literature on law, 
institutions, finance and growth.  First, much of the finance and growth literature focuses on the 
development of financial markets and formal institutions, such as banks, as the conduit for growth, 
and regards alternative finance as “picking up the slack” of formal finance and is therefore more 
costly for firms.  By contrast, our theory argues that nonmarket, nonbank finance, backed by 
alternative mechanisms, can be superior to bank and market finance, backed by legal institutions, in 
fast-growing economies.  Our theory also indicates that excessive regulation of alternative financial 
institutions, such as informal credit agencies, may be counter-productive in emerging markets.  
Second, the difference in how legal and alternative institutions adapt to changes implies that the 
pace of innovations is faster in economies, especially fast-growing economies, with effective 
alternative institutions than that in economies with a dominant but rigid legal system.  Innovations 
may be stymied if the legal system is captured by special interest groups.  The theory also sheds 
light on the comparison of different corporate governance systems among listed firms.  The 
effectiveness of shareholder-based system, prevalent in the US, UK and other common-law 
countries, depends crucially on the law and legal institutions.  A governance system that includes 
non-shareholder stakeholders, such as employees, business partners, customers and local 
communities, on the other hand, can be more effective in environments of weak laws and formal 
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legal institutions.  Hence, in most emerging countries firms and corporate sectors with strong 
stakeholder-based governance mechanisms are more likely to succeed. 
In Section II of the paper we present a series of case studies demonstrating the importance of 
alternative institutions and how they work in different countries.  In Section III we provide 
examples illustrating the problems with using the law as the basis for finance and commerce.  We 
compare and contrast the advantages and disadvantages of alternative and legal institutions in 
Section IV and discuss conditions for developing both types of institutions.  We then discuss policy 
implications and empirical predictions in Section V.  Finally, Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Case Studies and Examples of Alternative Institutions 
 In this section we provide a set of case studies on how alternative institutions and 
governance mechanisms work in different countries.  We first study China and India, the two largest 
and fastest growing emerging economies, as well as ‘emerged’ East Asian economies Taiwan and 
Korea.  We then look at a few developed countries, including Japan, Germany, and the UK.  The 
main purpose of all these case studies is to highlight the importance of alternative institutions in 
each of these economies’ high growth periods.3  
II.1 Alternative Institutions in Successful Emerging Economies: China and India 
Using information from the IMF, Table 1 presents GDPs based on simple exchange rates 
and international dollars (PPP terms) and the growth rates in GDPs and per capita GDP (both in 
constant prices) during 1990-2010 for the top twenty-five countries in each category.4  China is 
leading the world in terms of growth rates of both GDP and per capita GDP over this period.  
                                                 
3 See Allen and Qian (2010) for more details on how nonlegal institutions can deal with complicated, international 
transactions. For example, the global diamond industry has historically operated outside the legal systems and 
systematically ignored state-created laws (also see Bernstein 1992). Another industry that has relied on out-of-court 
mediations and arbitrations to settle disputes is reinsurance. 
4 Countries with population less than 10 million, GDP less than US$ 50 billion in 2010, or less than 15 years of GDP 
observations are excluded from the rankings in Table 1. 
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According to the IMF, China’s economy will surpass the US and become the largest in the world in 
PPP terms in 2016.  Sustaining the average annual growth rates of over 10% in GDP and over 9% in 
per capita GDP will be difficult for China.  However, as long as it maintains a growth rate that is at 
least twice as high as that of the US (e.g., 7% for China and 3% for the US), China will have double 
the size of the US around 2035.  Figure 1 compares growth in per capita GDP (in PPP terms) in 
Taiwan and Korea during 1960-2006 and China during 1980-2006 (i.e., first year for China in the 
figure correspond to 1980).  Given that China’s growth path is quite similar to that of Taiwan and 
Korea, only delayed by 20 years, it is reasonable to project that per capita GDP in China would 
catch up with the level of developed countries in another two to three decades if current trends 
continue.  While economic growth has widened the income and wealth gap in China as compared to 
the pre-reform period, it has elevated hundreds of millions of people from absolute poverty 
(Ravallion and Chen, 2004).  The growth rates in GDP and per capita GDP for India are the third 
highest in the world during 1990-2010.  At the end of 2010, India’s PPP-adjusted GDP is the fourth 
largest in the world and is expected to surpass Japan for the No.3 spot in the next few years.  With 
40 percent of the world’s population and the two largest emerging markets in the world, China and 
India are expected to play an increasingly important role in the global economy for years to come.  
The economic performance of China and India presents significant challenges to existing 
literature.  The ‘conventional wisdom’ is that a necessary condition for long-run economic growth is 
strong, Western-style institutions, including laws that protect small investors, a legal system that 
enforces contracts and resolves disputes, a financial system with efficient financial markets and a 
banking sector, and a democratic and benign government.  However, AQQ (2005) and ACDQQ 
(2011) document that both China and India have ineffective legal systems, banks and stock markets 
that are small relative to the economies and have played a limited role in allocating resources to 
most efficient uses, and governments that are regarded as among the most corrupt in the world. 
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These two countries also present distinctly different cases in their histories of developing 
Western-style legal and other formal institutions.  Transiting from a socialist system to a market-
based system, China had no formal commercial legal system and associated institutions in place 
when its economy began to take off in the 1980s.  However, historically China had a highly 
commercialized society without the development of Western institutions.  India, on the other hand, 
has a long history of Western legal institutions and financial systems due to its colonial ties to the 
UK.  Its formal legal and commercial banking systems date back more than two centuries, and the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), at 130 years, is the oldest in Asia.  Yet, Indian firms, like their 
Chinese counterparts, generally conduct business with little reliance on the legal system. 
China 
While there are many factors that contribute to economic growth in any country, we want to 
emphasize the role of alternative institutions in funding the growth of different corporate sectors in 
China.  Following AQQ (2008), we classify all the Chinese firms into three sectors: the State Sector 
(state-owned enterprises or SOEs, and all firms where the central government has ultimate control), 
the Listed Sector (publicly listed and traded firms with most of them converted from the State 
Sector), and the Hybrid Sector with all non-state, non-listed firms.5   
In our earlier work (AQQ 2005, 2008), we document that SOEs and publicly listed firms 
have much easier access to the legal system and banks and financial markets than firms in the 
Hybrid Sector.  While detailed data on firm-level financing is difficult to obtain for many firms in 
the Hybrid Sector, in aggregate this sector raises most of its external finance from nonbank sources. 
The size of the ‘shadow banking’ system is large, estimated as accounting for half of the total 
                                                 
5 It is important to point out that the Hybrid Sector includes privately or individually owned firms, and firms that are 
partially owned by local governments (e.g., Township Village Enterprises or TVEs). For more details on the 
descriptions and discussions of these three corporate sectors, see AQQ (2008). For a growth model explaining China’s 
growth, see, e.g., Song et al. (2011); for a review of China’s economic growth during the past thirty years, see the book, 
“China’s Great Economic Transformation,” edited by Brandt and Rawski (2008). 
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financing in China.6  Despite the obstacles to access bank and market finance, the growth of the 
Hybrid Sector has been much higher than that of the State and Listed sectors and contributes most 
of the economic growth.  For example, in terms of industrial output, the Hybrid Sector grew at an 
annual rate of over 30% between 1998 and 2010, while the State and Listed Sectors combined grew 
at around 17.8% during the same period.  The total output in 2010 is $7,832 billion for the Hybrid 
Sector, while it is around $2,903 billion in the State and Listed Sectors combined.  In terms of their 
contribution to the entire economy: the State Sector contributed more than two thirds of China’s 
GDP in 1980 and (non-agricultural) privately owned firms, a type of Hybrid Sector firm, were 
negligible, but in 2008 the State Sector only contributed 35% of the GDP (China Statistical 
Yearbook, 1998-2009).  In fact, with large samples of firms (from sources) with various ownership 
structures, Liu and Siu (2007) and Dollar and Wei (2007) both find that the return to capital is much 
higher in non-state sectors than the State Sector, and that a capital reallocation from state to private 
sectors would generate more growth in the economy.   
 Over the period from 1990 to 2010, the Hybrid Sector employed an average of over 70% of 
all non-agricultural workers; the TVEs (part of the Hybrid Sector) have been the most important 
employers providing (non-agricultural) jobs for residents in the rural areas, while (non-agricultural) 
privately owned firms employ more than 40% of the workforce in the urban areas.  Moreover, the 
number of employees working in the Hybrid Sector has been growing at 3.9% over this period, 
while the labor force in the State and Listed Sectors has been shrinking.  These patterns are 
particularly important for China, given its vast population and potential problems of unemployment 
and social unrest. 
What economic lessons can be learned from the extraordinary performance of the Hybrid 
Sector in China?  We argue that they are doing something fundamentally different that (Western) 
                                                 
6 See “Chinese Finance: A Shadowy Presence,” H. Sender, Financial Times, 04/01/11. 
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economists have yet to fully understand.  In the West, it is taken for granted that finance and 
commerce should be undertaken using the law as the basis for contracts.  Many would agree that the 
same argument should be applied to China:  
“The modern corporation based on a Western model would be the essential vehicle for private 
economic development.”  
Interestingly, this statement was not written today but was the view of China’s first 
Company Law in 1904 (Gongsilü), drafted by the then newly created Ministry of Commerce 
(Shangbu) of the waning Qing government and aimed at promoting China’s industrial development. 
Several subsequent versions of the Company Law (1904-1946) tried to promote the development of 
share-holding corporations with limited liabilities, but despite these attempts the model of Western-
style corporations was never taken up in China.  An important factor is that the philosophy of 
having a disperse ownership that included outsiders ran directly against the traditional Chinese 
model of keeping business within the family.  Indeed, most firms’ fear of incorporation stemmed 
from their distrust of government and unwillingness to let strangers gain partial control of the firm.7 
Despite the separation of finance and commerce from the legal system, China had a highly 
commercialized society.  The earliest form of capitalism can be traced back to the late Ming 
Dynasty (17th century), with commerce initiated in the Zhejiang-Jiangsu area and further developed 
during the Qing Dynasty (17th to early 20th century).  The Opium War (1840s) between China and 
UK destroyed China’s sovereignty, but it brought Western-style legal and capital systems into 
China’s coastal areas (until 1949).  During this period, foreign systems and the Chinese system co-
existed and commerce boomed.  Yet, despite the entrance and development of numerous Western-
style courts in Shanghai and other major coastal cities, most business-related disputes were resolved 
outside courts.  Since the Qing Dynasty, dispute resolution by guilds (merchant coalitions), families, 
                                                 
7 For more evidence on the history of the development of China’s financial system in the period discussed, see, for 
example, Kirby (1995), Lee (1993) and Goetzmann, Ukhov, and Zhu (2004). 
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and local notables based on explicit and implicit regulations of guilds, family traditions, and social 
norms was commonplace.  Chinese firms on the mainland (pre-1949) and later in Taiwan (after 
1949) did not use the provisions of the law but again conducted commerce outside the formal legal 
system.  Modern equivalents of these dispute and contract enforcing mechanisms are behind the 
success of firms in the Hybrid Sector since 1979. 
The development of China’s financial system from the late 19th century to the early 20th 
century was highlighted by the emergence of Shanghai as the financial center of Asia.  With 
thriving entrepreneurial and trading activities, financial institutions proliferated and financial 
innovations surged.  Merchants used up to eleven currencies in their transactions, some of which 
were printed by local banks.  The exchange rates of local currency saw wide fluctuations; many 
unregistered local banks (diaotang) engaged in high-leverage credit transactions with little capital 
reserves and defaulted frequently.  At the same time, merchants’ fear of risk spawned an active 
insurance industry, which was first introduced by the British.  To alleviate the problems of 
asymmetric information, foreign merchants hired Chinese middlemen (and guarantors) to select 
Chinese merchants.  Chinese and foreign merchants also devised the “commission indent system,” 
an early form of trade credit allowing firms and institutions to operate with minimum financial 
resources.  The stock exchange in Shanghai was the largest in Asia for most of the 1920s and 1930s.  
Interestingly, most of the development of China’s sophisticated financial system prior to 1949 
coincided with one of the most volatile periods in its history characterized by political turmoil and 
(civil and foreign) wars. 
Alternative institutions in the Hybrid Sector have two important and related components: 
The first is the way in which investment is financed.  The second is corporate governance.  During a 
firm’s life cycle, how the firm acquires its “seed” capital is arguably the most crucial financing 
stage.  AQQ (2005) present evidence on channels of seed capital, including funds from family and 
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friends and loans from private (unofficial) credit agencies (see also Tsai 2006).  There is also 
evidence that financing through illegal channels, such as smuggling, bribery, insider trading during 
early stages of the financial markets, and other underground or unofficial businesses also play an 
important role in the accumulation of seed capital.  Though a controversial issue for the 
government, our view, based on similar episodes in the history of other developing countries, is that 
as long as the purpose of money making is to invest in a legitimate company, it may be more 
productive for the government to provide incentives for investment rather than to expend the costs 
in discovering and punishing these activities.  Once a firm is established and doing well, internal 
finance and financing among business partners and other firms (e.g., trade credits) can provide the 
funds necessary for growth.   
 One of the most important alternative corporate governance mechanisms is competition in 
product and input markets, which has worked well in both developed and developing countries 
(e.g., McMillan 1995, 1997; Allen and Gale 1999; Giroud and Mueller, 2011).  A relevant factor for 
competition in an industry is entry barriers for new firms, as lower entry barriers foster competition. 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (DLLS hereafter, 2002) find that countries with 
less regulation of entry have less government corruption and smaller unofficial economies.  Another 
important mechanism, as discussed above, is reputation, trust, and relationships.  Greif (1989, 1993) 
argues that certain traders’ organizations in the 11th century were able to overcome problems of 
asymmetric information and the lack of legal and contract enforcement mechanisms, because they 
had developed institutions based on reputation, implicit contractual relations, and coalitions.8  Some 
aspects of the growth of these institutions resemble what worked to promote commerce and the 
financial system in China prior to 1949 and the operation of the Hybrid Sector today.  Without a 
dominant religion, many argue that the most important force in shaping social values in China and 
                                                 
8 Stulz and Williamson (2003) point out the importance of cultural and religious beliefs for the development of 
institutions, legal origins, and investor protections. 
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other Asian countries is the set of beliefs first formalized by Kongzi (Confucius) more than 2,500 
years ago.  They clearly define family and social orders, which are very different from western 
beliefs on the rule of law.  An implication of these beliefs is that reputation, relationships and trust 
are of high value in finance and commerce.  
To summarize, relying on alternative mechanisms, China has a long history of developing 
finance and commerce outside the legal system.  In recent years, there has been a concerted effort 
by the government to improve China’s legal system, including passing new laws in finance and 
commerce similar to those in western countries.  In our view, however, these laws have very limited 
impact in practice other than ‘window dressing’ for western investors who do not understand 
China.9  In fact, a major concern for China going forward is the ‘favorable treatment,’ in the form of 
low-cost financing and other benefits, received by the State and Listed Sectors over the Hybrid 
Sector.  While the State Sector has played a positive role during the financial crisis in terms of 
stabilizing the economy and picking up the slack for employment, too much cheap credit pumped 
into this sector has generated ‘bubbles’ in the real estate sector and implies that the truly efficient 
firms in the Hybrid Sector have not been funded by the banking sector (e.g., Kirby 2011).10   
India 
A review and comparison of India’s corporate sectors also provide a good example of the 
effectiveness of alternative mechanisms and problems with legal institutions.  With its English 
common-law origin, legal protection of investors by the law in India is one of the strongest in the 
world.  Moreover, India has had a British-style judicial system and a democratic government for a 
long time.  However, evidence from ACDQQ (2011) paints a different picture of investor protection 
                                                 
9 A good example is the bankruptcy law, with the current version enacted in June 2007. In many aspects it resembles 
bankruptcy codes in western countries. For example, secured creditors are paid ahead of employee claims, and allowed 
to vote in the reorganization plan. However, in most of the bankruptcy cases, creditors have little influence on the 
process; deviations from the stated priority rules are common place. When judges make decisions they often follow 
regulations from the State Council rather than bankruptcy law. See, e.g., AQZZ (2010), for more details.  
10 With the credit crunch following the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, rates on the “unofficial” (minjian) loans 
(uncollateralized) range from 7%-10% per month in Guangzhou, while the bank rate for a six-month loan is set at 
5.85% per annum (Xinhua News, 5/08/2011). 
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in practice.  Based on widely used measures, the effective level of investor protection and the 
quality of legal institutions in India is not much different from other large emerging economies.  
The wide gap between investor protection on paper and in practice can be attributed to a slow and 
inefficient legal system and government corruption in India.11  The Indian economy is unbalanced 
relative to other large economies, in that 52 percent of output is from services, 26 percent is from 
manufacturing and 22 percent is from agriculture (67 percent of workforce).  Manufacturing 
industries have not done well, and a widely accepted reason is that they are constrained by unions 
and political economy factors, including corruption and bureaucracy in the government and legal 
system.  New industries like software have done much better because they are not constrained by 
political economy factors as much and rely more on alternative mechanisms.  
 With a large sample of firms from all industries that include state-owned firms, listed firms 
and non-state, non-listed firms, ACDQQ (2011) document that internal finance is the most 
important financing source.  Alternative finance, defined as financing from all non-bank, non-
market sources and including trade credits and funds from family and friends, constitutes the most 
important form of external finance.  Not surprisingly, small and unlisted firms rely on alternative 
finance for a much greater proportion of their total funding needs.  On the other hand, the size of 
banking sector and financial markets is small relative to the size of the Indian economy, and 
alternative finance dominates financing from banks and financial markets combined.  As mentioned 
earlier, most existing research characterizes the role of alternative finance as “picking up the slack” 
of bank and market finance, and thus it is more costly.  But ACDQQ (2011) find that firms’ access 
to bank finance is not associated with higher growth rates.  These results indicate that bank and 
market finance is not superior to alternative finance in fast-growing economies such as India. 
 ACDQQ (2011) have also conducted detailed surveys of more than 200 firms from the 
                                                 
11 For example, an estimated 25 million cases are pending before the courts in India and it will take more than 300 years 
to clear the backlog (Bearak 2000). 
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Small- and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) sector in India, and the results clearly favor the use of 
alternative mechanisms over the law and legal system.  For example, when asked about their 
preferred actions following defaults, breaches of contract and disputes initiated by their business 
partners, over 80 percent of surveyed firms say they do not use the legal system at all.  Out-of-court 
channels of dispute resolution play a far more important role for these firms.  About 50 percent of 
the firms surveyed do not have a regular legal adviser.  When pressed for a reason, 63 percent of 
respondents who did not have legal advisors claimed they did not need lawyers as they knew all 
their business partners and could deal with them fairly.  Clearly, the formal legal system takes a 
back seat while reputation, trust and informal personal relationships are the driving factors in 
screening potential business opportunities.  The survey responses further indicate that not only is the 
law a disfavored means to resolve a breach that has already occurred or a dispute that has already 
arisen, but it also plays a weak role in dissuading future breaches and disputes.  To this end, the 
survey findings indicate that legal sanctions are far less important than the demands and 
responsibilities of the networks within which they exist and function.  For instance, in the case of 
default, late payment and a breach of contract, the primary concern is loss of future business 
opportunities or reputation; the fear of legal consequences (adverse court sentences or jail terms) is 
the least important concern, below even threat to personal safety.   
It is worth mentioning how entrepreneurs and investors alleviate and overcome problems 
associated with government corruption, which is rampant in many emerging economies including 
India and China.  An interesting aspect of corruption is that its damaging effects on economic 
growth seem to differ significantly across countries.  In the case of the provision of government 
goods and services, corruption occurs when the government cannot raise sufficient revenues to 
finance the costly provision, and bribes can be regarded as user fees.  With multiple officials 
‘competing’ to provide the same good or service (e.g., a license for a new start-up), the user fee is 
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determined competitively and the pernicious effects of corruption are minimized (Allen and Qian 
2009).  In addition, entrepreneurs can move from region to region to find the most supportive 
government official, which in turn motivates officials to lend “helping hands” rather than “grabbing 
hands.”  These remedies should be typically available in a large country with diverse regions like 
India and China.12   
II.2 Alternative Institutions in Successfully ‘Emerged’ Economies: Taiwan and South Korea13 
 The limited role played by the law and legal system in the economic growth of China and 
India has also been found in other prominent East Asian economies.  Next we review Taiwan and 
South Korea.  As mentioned earlier, these two economies are among the most successful in the 
post-WWII era, with their per capita GDP (in PPP terms) now at the same level as traditional 
industrialized nations such as the UK and France, and their GDP in the top twenty of the world.  
Both had powerful, autocratic (one-party) governments during the first three decades of their 
economic rise (post-WWII), and these governments, similar to that of China, actively promoted 
economic growth.  In the corporate sectors, family firms play an important role in both economies.   
Taiwan 
Both mainland China and Taiwan have had a long history of relying on nonlegal 
mechanisms to settle disputes.  As mentioned above, Taiwan also ‘inherited’ many of the nonlegal 
institutions that worked very effectively in mainland China up to 1949, and these institutions have 
been behind the success of the Taiwanese economy over the past five decades.  Also similar to 
China, small and medium firms (SMEs), usually privately owned, have contributed most to the 
growth of the economy and employment.  In fact, the early development of Taiwan from 1960s to 
                                                 
12 Complementing this view, Xu (2009) describes the importance of China’s unique institutional foundation of 
“regionally decentralized authoritarian system,” in which the sub-national governments have considerable autonomous 
power over regional economic decisions and at the same time remain under the control of the central government. This 
system alleviates the information problem that regulators face, and creates incentives for sub-national governors through 
personnel control and regional competition.  
13 We thank helpful comments from Charles Chang, Yencheng Chang and Son-nan Chen on Taiwan and from Namho 
Kang and Hayong Yun on S. Korea.   
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1990s was characterized by an export-oriented trade strategy and a market structure dominated by 
SMEs (e.g., Aw 2001).  Since the SMEs are most likely subject to informal dispute resolutions and 
financing methods mentioned above, this echoes the case of China where the informal sector grows 
much faster than the formal sector in terms of output and employment. 
While judges in Taiwan are considered to be better trained than their counterparts in 
mainland China, out-of-court settlements of disputes are also common.  Mediation committees are 
often assembled in cities and villages to provide a dispute resolution in manners consistent with 
local norms and customs (e.g., Huang 1996).  Some of these committees and programs are 
administered by Ministries of Justice and usually supported by the local government.  Chen et al. 
(2010) documents the extensive use of informal or private mediation in labor disputes in Taiwan.  
The process usually begins with an employee filing an application of mediation under the Labor 
Dispute Resolution Act (LDRA) to the local government.  The LDRA stipulates that upon receiving 
the application, the local government should form a mediation committee that consists of three 
people—one appointed by the employee, one by the employer, and the third by the local 
government.  In practice, however, local governments usually organize an informal committee 
consisting of only one government appointed member; another possibility is that the dispute may be 
transferred to private mediators.  In 2007, out of the 18,994 mediation applications, 38.84% and 
48.39% of the cases were conducted through the informal and the private mediation mode, 
respectively.  
Taiwan did not establish its first stock exchange (the Taiwan Stock Exchange) or the 
securities regulator (the Securities and Futures Commission, under the Ministry of Finance) until 
the early 1960s.  The Securities and Exchange Law was enacted in 1968.  Similar to many other 
Asian economies and mainland China before 1949, many of Taiwan’s listed firms are family-
controlled, and the ownership structure is concentrated.  More than 70% of the listed companies in 
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Taiwan have a controlling shareholder—holding more than 20% of the voting rights—in 1999, and 
the comparable number is 20.2% for Japan and 56.8% for Korea (Claessens et al., 2001).  Among 
those firms controlled by a single large shareholder, 48% are family controlled in Taiwan 
(Claessens et al., 1999).  Minority shareholder protection has not been well developed in the law.  
For example, Article 27 of Taiwan’s Company Law actually permits corporate and government 
shareholders to appoint individuals as directors and supervisors and replace them as they wish.  This 
creates a conflict of interest in that the directors may pursue the interest of the dominant 
shareholders rather than the best interest of the company (Liu, 2000, 2001). 
The prevailing ownership structure in Taiwan, along with weak protection of small 
shareholders, thus raises concerns for expropriation by large shareholders.  However, previous 
studies have shown that family-controlled firms do not underperform widely-held firms (without a 
controlling shareholder holding 20% or more of the votes), especially when the level of family 
control is high (see, e.g., Woidtke, Yeh and Lee 2001, and Chu 2009).  High levels of family control 
mitigate agency problems by aligning the interest of management with that of the owner.  
Moreover, a tight kin network may provide a valuable and unique competitive advantage to firms 
(Durand and Vargas, 2003; Sirmon and Hitt, 2003).  Local family connections can also work as a 
substitute for formal financing channels and pull in resources that otherwise would not be accessible 
to (small) firms (e.g., Peng and Jiang, 2008). 
Republic of Korea 
Unlike the important contribution of SMEs in Taiwan, Korea’s economic growth before the 
1997 Asian financial crisis was largely driven by large, vertically integrated, family owned 
conglomerate groups known as the “chaebols,” and a strong government.  Starting from the early 
1960s, when the process of rapid industrialization began, the government has a played a dominant 
role in Korea’s economic development by directing preferential lending to the chaebols to develop 
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targeted industries such as automobiles and electronics.  Bingham et al. (2007) document that the 
top thirty chaebols controlled 41% of the domestic economy in 1995; the top five chaebols 
controlled 26.3% of the domestic economy in 1999.  Chaebols are closely held and characterized by 
interlocking-ownership structures and overlapping boards of directors, with an average (founding) 
family ownership interest of 43% as a result of the cross-shareholdings in the top thirty chaebols.  
Chaebols also ensure their absolute control rights over the affiliated firms through a web of cross 
holding structures (e.g., Kim 2007).   
It is difficult for small shareholders to take legal actions against the company.  For example, 
during 1993-1997, a minimum five percent ownership is required by law for a shareholder to 
exercise rights such as inspecting accounting books, though the threshold decreased after the 1997 
crisis (Kim 2005).  Moreover, institutional investors face restrictions on the size of their ownership 
stakes and on the voting rights, making it possible for the founding families in chaebols to exert 
controls without a very large ownership stake.  In addition, many institutional investors are either 
subsidiaries of the chaebols or under heavy influence of the government (e.g. the Korean Pension 
Fund).  They will likely put the controlling owner’s interest before that of the minority shareholders.  
 Chaebols are regarded by some as having higher expropriation risk, and their special 
connection with the government also raises the question of corruption.  They were held responsible 
after the 1997 financial crisis in part due to high leverage and reckless lending in some firms.  As a 
result, there have been corporate governance reforms aimed specifically at chaebols.  However, the 
chaebol structure also has merits, especially in terms of providing valuable support to affiliated 
firms in addition to providing financing.  According to Kim and Nugent (1994), over 70 percent of 
Korea’s SMEs generated revenues from contracting and subcontracting from chaebols in the 1990s.  
Almost 90% of the SMEs involved in subcontracting generated more than 80 percent of their total 
revenues from the contracts with chaebols.  Korea created a dense network as firms’ (especially 
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SMEs) technology-support institutions during the 1970s and 1980s, SMEs still prefer to turn to 
private sources including chaebols for technical support. 
 Similarly to other successful Asian economies, disputes involving corporations and investors 
are rarely handled by courts and the legal system.  Somewhat differently to China and Taiwan, the 
Korean government plays an important and active role in settling disputes, especially those 
involving chaebols.  The close relationship between the Korean government and chaebols is 
described as “hierarchical as well as a nexus of implicit contracts” (Kim and Lee 2005).  The 
allocation of preferential credit to business firms that reached government-set export targets is an 
example of such implicit contracts.  The government and chaebols can be regarded as parts of an 
internal organization, with the government assuming the role of a senior partner of the private 
enterprises, rather than a regulatory authority (Jones and Sakong 1980).  The participation of the 
government in the resolution of disputes expedites the process so that critical projects of these firms 
would not be delayed.  On the other hand, stated laws and court procedures are not followed during 
the negotiation process, and the government can threaten with legal actions (such as ‘surprising 
audits’ of the chaebol firms) to ensure that the settlement agreement is followed by all the parties.   
The Korean and Taiwan experience highlights the importance of family firms and business 
groups as an effective alternative corporate governance mechanism.  First, Burkart et al. (2003) link 
the degree of separation of ownership and control to different legal environments, and show that 
family-run firms will emerge as the dominant form of ownership structure in countries with weak 
minority shareholder protections, whereas professionally managed firms are the optimal form in 
countries with strong protection.  Evidence in Claessens et al. (2000, 2002) and ACDQQ (2011) 
suggests that family firms are a norm in Asian countries, and these firms have performed well.  
Second, Allen and Gale (1999, 2000) show that, if cooperation among different suppliers of inputs 
is necessary and all suppliers benefit from the firm doing well, then a good equilibrium with no 
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external governance is possible, as internal, mutual monitoring can ensure the optimal outcome.  
Cooperation and mutual monitoring can ensure payments (as long as funds are available) among 
business partners despite the lack of external monitoring and contract enforcement.   
II.3 High Growth Periods of Developed Countries and the Evolution of Law and Markets  
We next review a few of the largest and most developed countries with the focus on the 
importance of law and legal institutions during high (and volatile) growth periods.  We begin with 
Japan and conclude that similar institutions found in other major Asian economies have also played 
important roles in Japan’s transformation.  We then review evidence from recent research that 
shows that during early stages of development, it was informal relationships of trust, rather than the 
law, that promoted the development of the financial systems in western European countries. 
Japan  
Before World War I, Japan’s financial system was already furnished with modern 
institutions such as a central bank, commercial banks and the concept of property rights.  The Meiji 
government adopted parts of the legal and financial systems from the West as part of the reform.  
However, these formal institutions were not utilized much in practice and Japan developed 
sophisticated economic and political systems operating outside the legal system before WWII (e.g., 
Upham 2002).  For example, large, family controlled business groups in Japan, which grew 
significantly from World War I to 1940, relied mostly on internal financing and relationship based 
lending from their “organ” banks (nonbank institutions with close ties to the families).  After the 
organ banks experienced massive failures in the crisis of 1927, modern industrial firms switched to 
the organizational form of joint-stock companies and were able to raise funds from the stock market 
in the absence of formal mechanisms of investor protection.  In fact, Japan had a high degree of 
ownership dispersion compared with UK and Germany at the beginning of the 20th century.  Franks, 
Mayer and Miyajima (2007) point out that informal arrangements based on trust are the major 
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reasons to sustain a dispersed ownership.  In particular, the equity stakes in the joint stock 
companies were marketed to outside shareholders by individuals known as “business coordinators,” 
who were typically highly respected businessmen in the local communities.  Community members 
agreed to invest their money in the companies based on their trust in the coordinators, who were 
also responsible for monitoring the firms in the interests of small and ‘outside’ shareholders.  
The alternative mechanisms are still at work for post-WWII Japan and serve as substitutes 
for legal enforcement.  A good example is the Board of Director’s duty of loyalty to the company, 
which prohibits the directors from taking advantage of their beneficiaries by means of fraudulent or 
unfair transactions (Clark 1986).  In 1950, Japan introduced the rule of the director’s duty of loyalty 
from the US (a key part of the Company Law) as Article 254-3 in its Commercial Code to improve 
Japanese corporate law and governance.  Despite this introduction, however, the article was largely 
ignored until the late 1980s and long after Japan’s high growth period and its emergence as one of 
the most developed nations in the world.  Kanda and Milhaupt (2003) argue that an important 
reason for the avoidance of the law is that a series of non-legal rules or social norms, based on 
reputation and relationships, governing the conduct of Japanese firms in the high-growth period was 
used outside the legal system.  Moreover, companies have broader views than listed firms in the US 
in that serving the interests of other (non-shareholder) stakeholders (e.g., employees, customers and 
business partners) is an important goal.  As a result, market participants and the legal community 
bypassed unfamiliar, transplanted legal rules (Milhaupt 1996).  After WWII, despite further 
influence of the US, Japan’s formal legal system actually shrank during the high economic growth 
period, and alternative mechanisms, similar to those in other Asian economies, were again the main 
force in finance and commerce. 
United Kingdom  
The UK had active stock markets at the start of the 20th century, characterized by a number 
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of local stock exchanges that specialized in particular industries.  Most of the listed companies were 
small or medium-size and the main purpose of equity issues was to finance acquisitions (using 
stocks).  An interesting fact from Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2006) is that despite almost nonexistent 
investor protection laws and unregulated stock markets at the beginning of the 20th century, the 
stock ownership of listed firms was quite dispersed at the time.  They conclude that there were 
effective alternative mechanisms, and, in particular, local trust, that prevented the managers from 
infringing investor’s rights (also see, e.g., Michie, 1987).  For example, in the event of acquisition, 
there was no evidence of controlling shareholders receiving a price premium over that by small 
shareholders, though no existing laws prevented the large shareholders from doing so.  The stock 
exchanges are located in the same cities and communities where companies are listed and most 
investors live and work.  Because the investors and the companies searching for finance are from 
the same closely knit communities, reputation is of great value for a company (e.g., for future 
financing purposes) and its directors; along with local trust these mechanisms ensure ‘good’ 
behaviors and substitute for laws and legal enforcement.  It was only after the geographical 
expansions of many firms that the formal rules of corporate governance such as the 1948 
Companies Act were in demand and enacted, since the expanded firms no longer depended solely 
on local finance.  Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2006) conclude that the law and legal enforcement 
introduced in the post-WWII era did not ‘cause’ a disperse ownership structure in the UK.         
 Germany  
Compared with the UK, Germany had better investor protection laws at the beginning of the 
20th century.  For example, it included provisions in 1861 giving investors the right to call an 
extraordinary general meeting provided the investor has at least a 10% voting equity stake.  
However, there was little further development in the law throughout most of the 20th century, and, 
in particular, there were no further modifications in investor protection clauses for a considerable 
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time.  The LLSV index of private enforcement remained 0 between 1900 and 1987 for Germany, 
and was raised to 0.21 as it is today after the new prospectus requirements were introduced.  More 
importantly, it is not clear that the investor protection provisions at the beginning of 20th century 
were applied in practice.  For example, the Second Joint-Stock Modification introduced formal rules 
to outlaw proxy voting without explicit content in 1884.  Nevertheless, the German banks, which 
accounted for a majority of proxy voting in Germany, generally circumvented this requirement by 
including the statement of using the votes of deposited shares in their business statements.  When 
investors use the banks as the custodians of their stocks, they effectively give the banks the proxy 
voting rights.  In fact, Franks, Mayer and Wagner (2006) show that in the first half of the 20th 
century, proxy votes exercised by the bank account for 38.8% of all votes and 89.5% of the votes 
exercised by the banks are proxy votes.  Thus, one can argue that Germany had weak or 
malfunctioning shareholder protection (in practice) at the beginning of the 20th century.  Its financial 
markets, however, bore resemblance to the UK markets in that firms raised large amounts from 
stock markets as compared to bank credit.  
Hence the interesting question is why small investors are willing to participate in the stock 
market despite a lack of legal protection.  Franks, Mayer and Wagner (2006) point out the 
importance of large banks which acted as both the promoters of the new equity issues and also 
custodians of individual stockholdings.  Small investors deposit their shares with the bank and trust 
the banks to do proxy voting on their behalf.  While this can create concentrated ownership and lead 
to a conflict between the interests of the banks and those of the minority investors, the offsetting 
force is once again reputation and trust of the banks, an important factor from the very beginning of 
the formation of the banks, which relied heavily on local investors and depositors.  
 
III. Problems with Using the Law as the Basis for Finance and Commerce  
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In this section we present examples that illustrate potential problems with using the law and 
legal system as the basis for finance and commerce.  The first set of examples focus on the rent 
seeking behaviors by vested interest groups that can make the legal system a barrier to innovations.  
We also provide examples to show that the limited capacity of the legislature can also slow down 
the pace of innovations and business transactions.  We focus on examples from developed 
countries, such as the US, for two reasons.  First, there is a commitment to use the law as the basis 
for finance and commerce in these countries, with legal institutions serving as the ultimate source 
for resolving disputes and enforcing contracts.  When there are fundamental changes in an economy 
(e.g., the Internet), companies and investors cannot implement these changes in all of their 
transactions and interactions until the law is revised, as they face litigation risk (e.g., copyright 
protection).  Second, if there are significant deficiencies in using the legal system in countries with 
the most developed institutions, these deficiencies are likely to be magnified in developing 
countries with poorer formal institutions.  
III.1 Rent-seeking by Vested Interest Groups  
A cornerstone of Western law and institutions is property rights.  A “hot-button” issue in 
property rights is the protection of intellectual property rights and their role in economic growth, 
which is also at the center of our comparisons between the two different systems of finance and 
commerce.14  We focus on two aspects of intellectual property rights.  First, whether the protection 
of exclusive rights (through patents, copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks, etc.) has a positive 
impact on the pace of innovations and second, the problems of using the law and legal institutions 
as the basis for disputes related to intellectual property rights.   
In any country with laws on intellectual property rights, the scope of patentable subject 
matter has traditionally not included fundamental scientific discoveries.  A frequently mentioned 
                                                 
14 Due to space limitations we cannot review all the evidence on intellectual property rights. See, e.g., Allen and Qian 
(2010) for more examples, and the OECD (2004) report and the Bessen and Meurer (2008) book for excellent reviews. 
 28
rationale for this omission is that, given the far-reaching impact in many fields of these discoveries, 
it would be impossible to outline the boundaries of the patent protection.  In fact, whether the 
boundary of a patent can be precisely defined is an important determinant of effective enforcement 
of the patent law (e.g., Bessen and Meurer 2008).  In the US and many other developed countries, 
once the patent is approved and issued, the primary forum for resolving disputes is the (federal) 
courts, which have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving the infringement of patents and 
appeals of court decisions. 
There is an extensive literature in industrial organization in economics examining the 
relationship between the protection of intellectual property rights and the pace of innovations during 
the past three decades, and the research yields mixed findings.  In the chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals industries, stronger and more effective protection has been found to lead to more 
R&D spending and innovations in developed countries.  This positive relation is attributed to the 
fact that most patents are valuable with clearly defined boundaries.  This, in turn, helps keep 
litigation costs (of alleged infringers) low.  However, even in these industries it is unclear whether 
the most important inventions and discoveries were made under the protection of property rights.  
As an example the process of discovering and producing penicillin, widely regarded as one 
of the most significant discoveries in modern medicine, is illuminating.  While believed to have 
been discovered by Alexander Fleming in 1928, several others had discovered its bacteriostatic 
effects as early as 1875.  The real challenge of the new “wonder drug” was how to produce it in 
large quantities.  This period coincided with World War II, during which penicillin significantly 
decreased the number of deaths and amputations caused by infected wounds among Allied Forces.  
Due to the large demand and costs of mass production, the price soared and a large amount was 
reserved for military use.  A team of British and American scientists finally made a breakthrough in 
the early 1940s allowing rapid production of the drug.  Penicillin production was quickly scaled up 
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and made available in quantities necessary to treat Allied soldiers wounded on D-Day.  As 
production rose, the price dropped from being nearly priceless in 1940, to $20 per dose in July 
1943, to $0.55 per dose by 1946.  Andrew Moyer, a member of the research team, was granted a 
patent in the US for a method of mass production of penicillin in May of 1948, after the commercial 
value of the drug had plummeted.  Other researchers and producers of penicillin had applied for 
patents in other European countries but the applications were turned down, as it was deemed 
unethical to provide exclusive rights for an invention that can save lives.  In fact, the attitude of 
governments and societies toward using patents and copyrights became increasingly pro-rights 
holders only after WWII. 
Outside the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, prior economic research finds that in 
many developed countries, there is no positive relation between the protection of intellectual 
property rights and the pace of innovations.  Instead, excessive protection deters competition, which 
is another important factor in spurring innovations, and small inventors do not benefit from the laws 
on intellectual property as much as large corporations.  In addition, based on changes in patent laws 
and enforcement regulations, Lerner (2002; 2005), among others, finds only weak or no evidence 
that strengthening patent rights and the enforcement of patent laws spur the pace of innovations 
across developed countries.  
Research in developing countries also generally fails to establish a positive relationship 
between the protection of intellectual property rights and the pace of innovations.  This is in part 
due to weak enforcement of such rights and the lack of other relevant institutions.  China is often 
singled out as notoriously bad in protecting intellectual property rights, as copying and imitation via 
reverse engineering is a prevalent strategy across industries.  Legal actions by foreign firms have 
been nearly useless in preventing these activities.  Despite efforts by the government to pass new 
laws and strengthen existing ones, including those on intellectual property rights, in part as a 
 30
response to mounting international pressure, it is doubtful that these efforts will have any system-
wide impact.  First, there is no systematic statement of the law of property or clear definitions of 
private property rights in the constitution.  Second, law enforcement is likely to be ineffective due 
to the intrinsic conflict of interest between fair play in practicing law and the monopoly power of 
the single ruling party, especially in cases in which government officials or their affiliates are 
involved (e.g., Clarke et al. 2008).  Notably, though, while the protection of intellectual rights in 
China has been poor, the pace of innovations has been furious due to the pressure of competition. 
One of the main problems of the patent system based on the law is that it motivates rent-
seeking behaviors by interest groups.  An example to illustrate such behavior is that companies, 
especially large corporations with abundant resources, come up with numerous nonessential 
inventions to pad the one significant (patented) invention or establish a new standard in production 
(e.g., Dewatripont and Legros 2007).  The creation of such a standard can impact the use of many 
different technologies – in the case of mobile technology, for instance, a production standard on a 
new handset requires the use of more than a thousand technologies protected by patents.  By 
jamming the patent system with extra patents or standards the patent holders can essentially block 
or delay innovations by competitors.  This is what has led to the FRAND concept – “fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory royalties.”  Another form of rent-seeking behavior is that patent holders, 
especially those with more resources, seek the best possible legal venue to maximize the likelihood 
of winning a lawsuit against patent or copyright infringements.  This type of behavior runs against 
the principal that the legal system within a democracy should be based on fair procedures and 
should allow equal access to all.   
In our next set of examples, we examine recent innovations in communications and 
knowledge industries based on the Internet revolutions.  Some of these inventions are free of charge 
and are not protected by patents or copyrights, while others do charge and are protected.  As 
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discussed above, when it is difficult to determine whether an invention has broached the boundary 
of a patent, as is often the case for Internet related innovations, enforcement becomes ineffective 
and may cause rent-seeking behaviors to escalate.  On the knowledge front, SSRN (Social Science 
Research Network) and JSTOR are great academic inventions that bring new working papers and 
published articles, in electronic format, to individual researchers worldwide at essentially no 
marginal cost (based on institutional subscriptions).  For the general public, Wikipedia, a 
multilingual, web-based platform with free content, is quickly becoming the most useful 
encyclopedia.  Written collaboratively by volunteers from around the world, the Wikipedia articles 
provide links to guide users to related pages with additional information and offer a useful point to 
begin research on almost any subject.  Since its creation in 2001, it has grown rapidly into one of 
the largest reference websites attracting over 600 million visitors annually by 2008. 
While the growth of Wikipedia has met with little resistance from the traditional media 
companies, it is a totally different situation with Google’s equally ambitious “Print and Library 
Project.”  Under the “fair use doctrine” of the US Copyright Law, Google’s plan has two 
components, Google Publisher Program, in which a publisher holding copyrights to a book can 
authorize Google to scan the entire book into Google’s search database, and Google Library Project, 
where some of the largest libraries (Harvard, Oxford and Stanford Universities, University of 
Michigan, and the New York Public Library) allow Google to scan materials.  According to Google, 
for books/print materials in the public domain (not subject to copyright) from the libraries, Google 
will display the full text of the book with the search result; for those that are still covered by 
copyrights, readers can only see a few sentences of the text around the search item; copyright 
holders can also exclude selected books from Google Print.  Ever since the initial idea of the Project 
floated around, it was met with disdain from publishing companies.  The Association of American 
Publishers, including well-known companies such as Penguin, McGraw-Hill, Pearson Education, 
 32
Simon & Schuster and John Wiley & Sons, and the Authors Guild, the nation’s largest organization 
of book authors, filed suits against Google in the second half of 2005.   
After several years of painstaking negotiations, Google finally worked out a $125 million 
legal settlement with groups representing authors and publishers.  However, on March 22, 2011, a 
federal judge in New York rejected the legal settlement (see New York Times, 3/22/11).  While 
Judge Denny Chin acknowledges that “the creation of a universal digital library would benefit 
many,” he said it would have granted Google a “de facto monopoly” and the right to profit from 
books without the permission of copyright owners.  Regardless of whether Google will gain 
monopolist status in the new realm of digital library, a project that clearly benefits societies 
worldwide must be put off indefinitely due to the legal process—first the lawsuits filed by the 
publishers, followed by the lengthy negotiations and now the new court ruling. 
Interestingly, a similar dispute has occurred in China between Baidu, which has the largest 
online search engine in China, and groups representing authors and publishers.  Perhaps inspired by 
Google’s efforts, Baidu has built its own online library (‘Bai Du Wen Ku’) which contains PDF files 
of millions of Chinese books, novels, and articles (including online commentaries).  Almost all of 
the files are free for viewing, and for downloading some books and articles there is a small charge 
using electronic ‘points.’  Around the same time when the US judge rejected Google’s settlement 
with US publishers, several groups of Chinese authors and publishers released an open letter, in 
which they accuse Baidu of copyright infringement.  Baidu has since issued an ‘open apology’ to 
the writers but settlement has not been reached yet.  More importantly, all indications are that the 
online library will remain open to the public.15  The comparison between the Google and Baidu 
cases highlights what we view as an important difference in the role of legal system in China and 
the US.  In the US, companies cannot implement innovations until the legal system clears and 
                                                 
15 The website for Baidu’s online library is http://wenku.baidu.com/.  For more details on the dispute see, e.g., 
http://edu.sina.com.cn/en/2011-03-25/173260304.shtml.  
 33
settles all the disputes with other entities, whereas in China innovations are implemented first and 
then settlements, often reached without using the legal system, come later.      
Another interesting comparison is the Linux operating system, started in 1991 by Linus 
Torvalds, versus the Windows system, the most prominent operating system released under a 
proprietary software license by Microsoft.  A Unix-like computer operating system, Linux is one of 
the most prominent examples of free software and open source development.16  Typically, all 
underlying source codes can be freely modified, used and redistributed.  In terms of market share, it 
is not surprising to see that Windows dominates the desktop and personal computer markets with 
about 90 percent of market share, as compared to 1 percent market share by Linux.  However, we 
see a role reversal of their market shares in the segment of ‘supercomputers.’  According to 
http://www.top500.org/, the website that tracks the world’s fastest supercomputers, as of November 
2010 Linux powers more than 80 percent of the world’s 500 most powerful supercomputers, and 
each of the world’s fastest 10 computers uses Linux.  By contrast, only 5 out of the 500 
supercomputers use the Windows system, a market share of 1%.  Proponents of free software argue 
that the key strength of Linux is that it respects what they consider to be the users’ essential 
freedom – to run, study, change, and to redistribute copies with or without changes free of charge. 
We end this subsection with a comment on the effectiveness of using lawsuits to protect 
patents and copyrights.  As in the case of online resources, the efforts by vested interest groups 
seem to be largely ineffective when the general public is engaged in the ‘illegal act’ at low costs 
(e.g., Wikipedia), but these efforts become more effective when a single company is leading the 
implementation of new technologies (e.g., Google’s Print Project).  The contrast in these cases, 
however, suggests that using the law as the basis for the protection of intellectual property rights 
                                                 
16 Nobody registered the name Linux till August 1995, when William Della Croce, Jr. applied for a trademark and 
demanded royalties from Linux distributors. Mr. Torvalds and other affected organizations sued him and the case was 
settled in 1997. Mr. Torvalds has stated that he trademarked the name to prevent others from using it, but was bound in 
2005 by the US trademark law to take active measures to enforce the trademark. As a result, the Linux Mark Institute, 
holder of the name, had to request a fee be paid for the use of the name and a number of companies have complied. 
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can induce rent-seeking behavior by the interest groups that will have the most to lose given the 
new technologies, and their efforts can become significant barriers to changes and innovations. 
III.2 Limited Capacity of the Legislature 
Another problem of using the law as the basis for finance and commerce is the limited 
capacity and fixed costs associated with revising the law as required by changes in the economic 
environment.  In a democracy, the legislature (and electorate) must approve any revisions in the law 
before companies and investors can implement new technologies or innovations without concerns 
of breaking the law.  However, politicians have limited time and effort that can be devoted to any 
given area of the law, and hence there is a legislature capacity and a fixed cost in revising the law. 
The following example illustrates that such limited capacity and fixed costs can single handedly 
slow down the pace of financial and business transactions in practice.  
Figure 2 compares payments systems in major developed economies.  At the start of the 
twenty-first century the US had a nineteenth century payments system, relying mostly on checks 
and the mail, and significantly lagging behind other developed nations.  While countries like 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland had almost completely abandoned checks (and 
rely instead on electronic payments systems), about half of all the payments in the US were still in 
the form of paper checks.  Under the old Uniform Commercial Code, the only legally acceptable 
proof of payment was cancelled checks, or checks processed by both the deposited and paying 
financial institutions.  Hence, checks had to be physically transported from where they were 
deposited to a central operations center, then to the clearer and then back to the banks they were 
drawn on.  This check-and-clearing process significantly delayed business transactions as compared 
to electronic methods.  
How costly was this backward payment system?  Using information from Humphrey et al. 
(1996) and Bolt et al. (2005), we can conduct a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation.  From 
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cross-country comparisons and analysis, these researchers suggest that there are savings of about 1-
2 percent of GDP when a country moves away from paper checks (e.g., the US) and towards 
electronic-based methods.  The US 2001 GDP was $10,400 billion, which indicates that the 
magnitude of savings from reforming the payment system to be $104 billion to $208 billion per year.  
With a 5 percent discount rate (roughly the risk-free rate in the US at the time), the discounted 
present value of this savings (assuming a ten-year growing annuity of 2 percent per year to control 
for inflation) is between $1 trillion to $2 trillion; in other words, the magnitude of the savings is 
comparable with the total cost of the most recent Iraqi war, and (using the midpoint of $1.5 trillion) 
it can finance both the bank bailout (TARP, $700 billion) and the fiscal stimulus plans ($787 billion) 
in the US resulted from the worst financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression. 
Despite years of calls for changes from the banks and businesses, the US Congress appeared 
not in a hurry to solve this seemingly simple yet costly problem.  Without the approval of the 
legislature, banks cannot expedite the payment process due to the fear of lawsuits.  Then, the tragic 
events of September 11, 2001 occurred and served as a catalyst for change.  After the terrorist attack 
all commercial flights in the US were grounded for several days, completely halting the check 
clearing process.  After the flights resumed, the call for change in the payments system finally 
resonated with Congress.  The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (“Check 21 Act”) was 
signed in October 2003 and became effective one year later.  The Check 21 Act allows electronic 
images of both sides of paper checks to be a “legally equivalent” substitute for the original checks, 
and these “substitute checks” can be exchanged among financial institutions including banks, 
clearing houses and the Federal Reserve Bank (see, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (2008) for more details).  Therefore, the clearing process is no longer dependent on the mail 
and transportation system.  
To summarize, in this section we presented examples to highlight two potential problems of 
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relying on the law as the basis for finance and commerce: rent-seeking behaviors by vested interest 
groups and limited capacity of the legislature in approving changes to the law.  We also argue that 
these problems are likely to be worsened in developing countries until they can develop sound legal 
and other related institutions.   
     
IV. Comparing Legal Institutions and Alternative Mechanisms 
The above examples motivate our comparisons of two different sets of systems.  The first 
system, employed by developed and democratic countries such as the US, commits to use the law as 
the basis for finance and commerce and legal institutions as the ultimate source for resolving 
disputes and enforcing contracts; further, changes to the law must be approved by the legislature 
and electorate.  In the second system, symbolized by countries such as China, there is no systematic 
definition of private property rights or property law, and, in practice, nonlegal mechanisms are the 
norm for conducting business; the process of change in finance and commerce is often bottom up 
rather than top down.  We make these classifications to better differentiate these two systems and 
facilitate the comparisons, but they may not be mutually exclusive when we look at a particular 
country.  In fact, as the literature on legal pluralism (see, e.g., Merry (1988) for a review) shows, in 
many countries these two systems can coexist but do not necessarily work to improve each other. 
In what follows we compare the advantages and disadvantages of conducting finance and 
commerce in these two systems.  We then discuss conditions under which one of the two systems is 
superior.  Finally, we provide discussions on policy implications based on our analysis. 
IV.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Legal and Alternative Institutions    
There are well-known advantages of using the law and legal system as the basis for finance 
and commerce.  The legal system of a democratic society allows equal and full access by all and 
promises fairness in trials and settlements.  Backed by the government and legislature, the legal 
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system also has the ultimate authority in its decisions on any and all disputes.  The legal system is 
endowed with powerful enforcement mechanisms, including criminal penalties, such as 
imprisonment, as well as civil laws and financial penalties to affect people’s behaviors.  These 
enforcement mechanisms and penalties provide strong incentives for individuals and organizations 
to follow the resolutions endorsed by the legal system, which in turn provides long-term stability in 
the economy.  The legal process, including resolution and enforcement, can be anonymous (e.g., 
details of a settlement of a dispute may not be disclosed) or transparent (the entire procedure of a 
high-profile trial may be covered by media).  By using the entire legal system, the marginal costs 
for managing an additional case (e.g., enforcing similar types of contracts or resolving disputes) can 
be reduced, and this improves overall efficiency. 
However, there are also disadvantages in using the law and legal institutions.  First, recent 
research on political economy factors suggests that rent-seeking behaviors by vested interest groups 
can turn legal institutions into barriers to changes.  For example, Rajan and Zingales (2003a; 2003b) 
suggest that development of a formal financial system may trigger political economy costs, causing 
a disconnection between the level of financial market activity and economic development. 
Similarly, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find that while “contracting institutions,” or laws 
protecting contracts between individual parties, do not affect long-term growth, “property rights 
institutions,” or laws and regulations restraining powerful elites and the government, do affect 
economic growth.17  We expect these problems to be much more severe in developing countries, 
where the costs of building good institutions can be enormous.  We argue that one way to solve this 
problem is not to use the law as the basis for finance and commerce but instead to use alternative 
mechanisms, as the experience in China and India documented earlier shows. 
                                                 
17 Other papers examine different aspects of the political economy and their effects on finance and growth. For example, 
Pagano and Volpin (2005) shows that strict labor regulation induces the manager to use long-term wage contracts to 
defend against hostile but possibly efficient takeovers. Roe (2006, 2007) proposes that the observed divergent 
ownership structures and the differing depths of securities markets across countries are largely determined by the 
different political goals of the nations, rather than the legal origins. 
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Second, in democracies there can be a lengthy political process before significant changes 
can be approved (by the majority of the electorate or legislature), and the people in charge of 
approving or disapproving changes (e.g., politicians and judges) may lack expertise in the business 
transactions under scrutiny and have limited capacity (time and effort) to study the proposed 
changes.  The process of passing the Check 21 Act epitomizes this capacity issue.  In addition, as 
demonstrated in the examples in the previous section, interest groups with more resources may 
receive more protection than individuals and organizations with fewer resources.  This asymmetry 
in protection induces more rent-seeking behaviors and further deters innovations. 
Unlike the legislature, which has monopoly power and authority in revising the law, one of 
the main advantages for alternative mechanisms, along with the bottom up process for changes, is 
that such mechanisms are more likely to foster competition among different mediation/resolution 
agencies/organizations.  Competition can ensure that the most efficient mechanism prevails – for 
example, only experts are involved in the rule-changing process.  Competition can also limit rent-
seeking behaviors by one or more groups.  As a result, alternative mechanisms as described can be 
much faster in adopting new rules to deal with changes in finance commerce since these changes do 
not require the permission from the legislature or electorate.  
One of the main disadvantages of the alternative mechanisms is the lack of enforcement 
power and authority.  Without the backing of the government and judicial system, alternative 
mechanisms can only rely on reputation along with economic and financial incentives (e.g., 
avoiding future losses due to sanctions by other members of the network or coalition) and mutual 
monitoring to enforce contractual agreements.  These methods may be insufficient to ensure good 
behavior if future losses are not substantial relative to the gains that can be made today, or if these 
losses can be recuperated by entering other lines of business or networks.  Another negative for 
alternative mechanisms is that by design they exist among a network and thus may be inaccessible 
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to outsiders; partial access by outsiders may come with the price of biased outcomes in dispute 
resolution favoring insiders.  In addition, frequent changes adopted by a network (or networks) 
create instability in the entire economy and hence weak long-term incentives.18 
These advantages and disadvantages lead to the tradeoffs of the two systems in different 
economic environments.  In static environments with infrequent and predictable changes (i.e., 
mature and slow-growing economies and industries), the advantages of the legal mechanisms 
dominate the disadvantages.  First, the strong incentives provided by the enforcement mechanisms 
of the legal system imply that efficient systems can be designed that do not rely solely on positive 
monetary incentives.  Second, the fixed costs of using the legal system when changes occur can be 
negated by the infrequent revisions of the law; the legislature and the judicial system can appoint 
experts to be involved with the process of changing the law and grant them the authority in decision 
making.  The combination of effective enforcement and infrequent changes also implies that there is 
stability in the system, which in turn creates strong long-term incentives for economic agents to 
play by the (universal) rule.    
In dynamic environments with frequent and unforeseen shocks (i.e., new industries and/or 
emerging, fast-growing economies such as China and India), however, the disadvantages of legal 
mechanisms are magnified and can outweigh their advantages.  The lengthy approval process by the 
legislature and electorate of any change to the law, along with the limited capacity and possible lack 
of expertise by the judges and politicians, means that the legal system is slow in reacting to changes. 
Moreover, a legal system captured by interest groups can oppose changes, and with its monopoly 
power it can become a barrier to competition and innovations.  On the other hand, alternative 
mechanisms can adapt to changes much more quickly, and this process does not require the 
approval of the legislature.  Weak enforcement power and long-term incentives of the alternative 
                                                 
18 See Dixit (2004) for an excellent review of the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative mechanisms. 
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mechanisms can be significantly strengthened by effective reputation mechanisms as long as there 
are long-term profits to be made and shared by participating individuals and organizations.      
The interaction between legal and alternative mechanisms is another reason why alternative 
mechanisms can promote economic growth and improve social welfare, even in static environments 
(and slow growing, developed economies).  Since most of the laws are adopted from best practices, 
having a viable system of alternatives can thus improve the efficiency of legal institutions, 
especially in dynamic environments.  Competition among formal and alternative mechanisms can 
also ensure that the best mechanism will be eventually adopted in the entire economy, and it is one 
of the keys to sustaining long-term economic growth.  A viable alternative system is especially 
important in environments where special interest groups can easily capture the legal system.  
Finally, a fair and functional legal system can also improve the effectiveness of alternative 
mechanisms by adopting the best rules and enforcing the changes in the entire economy and by 
instilling stability amid frequent changes.   
IV.2 Conditions for Developing Legal and Alternative Institutions 
One reason that we advocate for alternative institutions is that the costs for developing 
formal institutions can be prohibitively high in emerging economies and the process can take 
years.19  By contrast, the costs for developing alternative institutions are much lower as many such 
institutions have been in existence (often in certain regions and/or corporate sectors) for generations 
as a result of historical ties and social norms.  But this implies that there can be a set of conditions 
required for a viable system of alternative mechanisms to exist and work.  A good example is 
Africa.  Clearly past efforts in building formal institutions by different governments and 
organizations have not worked well in promoting financial development and economic growth.  It 
appears that alternative institutions have not worked well either, at least not as successfully as those 
                                                 
19 Consistent with this view, Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) find that, despite apparent significant economic 
benefits from reform, there is very little time variation of creditor rights over the past 25 years around the globe.  
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in emerging Asian countries such as China and India.   
What is missing in Africa?  Prior literature on development economics suggests that 
constant internal and external conflicts, including those related to and caused by ethnic 
fractionalization, have plagued many African countries over the past several centuries (e.g., Easterly 
and Levine, 1997).  As described earlier, the experience in China during the first half of the 20th 
century (prior to 1949) suggests that political stability is not necessary to foster effective alternative 
institutions.  However, what are common in China and India are long-lasting traditions and strong 
social and business ties and trust among families and in local communities, and these have 
contributed to the workings of alternative institutions—for example, dispute resolution mechanisms 
based on local notables and traditions.  Hence, the lack of similar long-standing traditions and trust 
in conflict-stricken areas can be one reason why alternative institutions have not taken off in Africa.     
The second factor, as documented in Allen, Carletti, Cull, Qian and Senbet (ACCQS, 2011), 
is related to population density.  ACCQS compare determinants that are associated with banking 
sector development in Africa vs. those in other developing countries.  They find that while factors 
such as the natural resource ‘curse’ and macroeconomic policies matter as much in Africa as in 
other emerging countries, population density matters a lot more for Africa’s financial development.  
In most sub-Saharan African countries population density is much lower than that in China and 
India, and road coverage (including railroads) is poor.  It is reasonable to argue that frequent 
interactions among firms, households, and investors are a necessary condition for business 
transactions and a viable system of alternative institutions.  Their results thus imply that this is 
lacking in Africa and the costs for building roads are high.  Given the associated high costs of 
developing viable banking sectors outside metropolitan areas—not surprisingly, bank branch 
penetration in Africa is much lower than that in China, technology advances, such as mobile 
banking, could be a promising way to facilitate both formal and alternative institutions in Africa.   
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We close this section by briefly talking about how to build formal institutions in emerging 
economies.  While alternative institutions have been highly effective in the success of Hybrid Sector 
in China, these institutions have not been effective for the Listed Sector and the development of 
financial markets.  There is abundant evidence (e.g., AQQ, 2008) showing that the financial markets 
in China are not efficient and have been plagued by insider trading and self-dealing transactions, 
similar to many other emerging economies (DLLS 2008).  Financial markets have not played a 
central role during the past three decades of China’s economic transition, but their role is likely to 
become much more important going forward, and so building legal and other formal institutions is a 
big part of the efforts.  The same argument can be made for many other emerging economies. 
There are two ways in which markets are regulated in practice: First, market forces and self-
regulation, and second, government regulation.  As described earlier, a good example of the first 
type of regulation is the capital markets in the UK in the 19th and early 20th century.  The role of 
government regulation and intervention was minimal, yet the markets did extremely well and 
London became the financial capital of the world.  As discussed earlier, one reason that the nonlegal 
mechanisms were effective is that many firms and exchanges are (initially) developed within tightly 
knitted communities, so that reputation and trust became one of the most important factors during 
business transactions and interactions among all the stakeholders of the firms.      
 In contrast, one of the central goals for developing the Chinese stock market in the early 
1990s was to (partially) privatize firms in the State Sector.  Hence from the very beginning, large 
and inefficient SOEs have had much easier access to the markets than the most efficient firms from 
the Hybrid Sector.  In addition, the government plays the dual roles of regulator and large 
shareholder of most of the listed firms—through holdings of large amounts of nontradable shares.  
In fact, two thirds of the total number of shares in China prior to 2005 are held by the government 
and related entities (AQQZ 2010).  These led to bad incentives and many loopholes.   
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So what should China and other emerging economies do to improve regulations?  Recent 
research has shown that this involves changing the entire regulatory environment and reforming 
many (if not all) formal institutions in order for any one law or regulation to be effective.  For 
example, Price et al. (2011) find that despite the efforts of regulators to push for the best practice of 
corporate governance in Mexico, including extensive disclosure of different aspects of governance 
(e.g., structure of the board, internal control and executive compensation) similar to that of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, there is no evidence that the overall disclosure quality or the 
operating performance has improved as a result of the governance reform.  The authors conclude 
that this is because the broad institutional environment in Mexico remains weak, so that the effect of 
any legal reform is limited at best.  A particularly important element is the concentrated ownership 
structure that significantly curtails outside monitoring and makes it difficult to implement the US-
style shareholder-based governance mechanisms.  In this regard, the recent share reform in China, 
which has converted and floated most of the nontradable shares controlled by the government into 
tradable shares, can have wide-ranging impact on other governance reforms in the Listed Sector.    
While undertaking system-wide changes is a considerable challenge for emerging 
economies, major steps that are cost-effective can be taken to complete the entire task.  Based on 
comprehensive studies of securities laws and enforcement institutions across the globe, LLS (2008) 
and DLLS (2008) conclude that information disclosure by the largest shareholders—and in 
particular, their ownership stakes in related parties, and allowing disinterested (smaller) 
shareholders to participate in the decision-making process are effective measures to restrain self-
dealing transactions and promote stock market development; and these measures are (relatively) 
inexpensive to implement as compared to measures such as liability rules and litigation process.  Li 
et al. (2011) compare how regulators tackle different types of widespread tunneling activities in 
China.  They find that laws and regulations that are more clearly defined and easier to enforce, as 
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measured by lower costs in verifying legal vs. illegal transactions, will be more effective, especially 
in countries with weak institutions.  In addition, laws and regulations are better enforced with well 
trained professionals with the correct incentives (e.g., Gleaser, Johnson and Shleifer, 2001). 
 
V. Empirical Predictions and Policy Implications        
In this section we provide testable predictions based on our theory and contrast them with 
existing literature on law, institutions, finance and growth.  We also discuss policy implications 
regarding how to develop institutions in emerging economies.  While there are extensive strands of 
literature studying law and legal institutions and their relationships to finance and growth, much less 
has been conducted in understanding alternative institutions in developed and developing 
economies and their role in supporting finance and growth.  The main difficulty is the availability of 
data on alternative institutions and how they are utilized by firms, investors and other economic 
agents and entities.  Data issues are particularly pronounced for small and medium firms that are not 
publicly listed but rely on these institutions much more than large and listed companies.  Therefore, 
research methods such as household and firm surveys become much more important and in some 
cases these are perhaps the only way to get around the problem of lack of publicly available data.  
The other obstacle is identification strategies to separate the effects of alternative institutions from 
those of legal and formal institutions on financial and economic development, as they can be 
correlated in certain industries, countries and regions.   
V.1 Empirical Predictions on Finance, Governance, and Economic Growth 
One of the key predictions of the law and finance literature is that differences in the law and 
legal institutions have first order effects on financial development and economic growth.  Since the 
common-law system provides the strongest protection to small investors and given the dominance 
of the US financial markets, a central implication of this line of work is that emerging markets 
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should exert efforts in developing legal institutions similar to the common-law system.  By contrast, 
we argue that law and legal institutions do not matter much for fast-growing economies and during 
early stages of economic growth, so comparisons across developing countries will find that 
differences in these formal institutions cannot explain much of the differences in financial 
development (broadly defined) and economic growth.  Our theory demonstrates that in these cases it 
is the viable alternative institutions that matter for financial development and economic growth.  
Our work on China, India and Africa suggests that this is the case.  On the other hand, the 
difference in law will matter more for more developed countries, and there is plenty of empirical 
evidence (by LLSV and others) to support this at the country, industry and firm level.   
Our theory also offers micro-level predictions on the different impact of legal and alternative 
institutions across corporate sectors (in both developed and developing countries).  Large 
manufacturing firms with abundant tangible assets have easy access to bank finance and these (and 
listed) firms have easy access to legal institutions.  On the other end of the corporate spectrum, 
unlisted firms and small and medium firms, especially those with a large amount of intangible 
assets, have much more difficulty in accessing formal financial and legal institutions, but they can 
grow much faster and contribute more to overall economic growth (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2005), as long as viable alternative mechanisms are at play.    
A related issue is the pace of innovations and business transactions and the strength of legal 
and alternative institutions.  As discussed earlier, competition among firms is an important driver 
for innovations, and excessive protection of property rights along with rent-seeking behaviors can 
deter innovations.  We have also shown that nonlegal mechanisms can substitute for legal 
mechanisms and do better in enforcing contracts and resolving disputes.  Therefore, as long as there 
are viable alternative institutions, contract disputes should not delay the pace of innovations and 
business transactions even without a functioning legal system.  The difference in how legal and 
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alternative institutions adapt to changes also implies that the pace of innovations is faster in 
economies, especially fast-growing economies, with effective alternative institutions than that in 
economies with a dominant but rigid legal system.  By contrast, innovations may be stymied if the 
legal system is captured by special interest groups. 
Our theory also provides distinct predictions as compared to the literature on finance and 
growth.  Most of the literature regards the development of financial markets and banks as the 
cornerstone for developing the financial system, which in turn promotes economic growth by 
providing external financing to firms.  The literature also considers alternative finance as “picking 
up the slack” of bank and market finance and is therefore more costly for firms (e.g., Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1998); Beck et al. (2005); Ayyagari et al. (2010)).  Therefore, firms with 
access to market and bank finance are expected to grow faster than those without such access.  By 
contrast, our theory argues that nonmarket, nonbank finance, backed by alternative mechanisms, 
can be superior to bank and market finance especially in fast-growing developing economies.  
ACDQQ (2011) provide evidence from India that is consistent with this prediction.  An important 
type of alternative financing channel is trade credits.  Recent research from both developed and 
developing countries has shown that while the initial fixed costs of trade credits can be high among 
firms without a long-term relationship, once a network of firms, customers and investors is forged, 
the average costs over an extended period can drop quickly so that the costs can be lower than those 
based on arms-length relationships including market and bank finance (e.g., Giannetti, Burkart, and 
Elligensen (2007); Giannetti and Yu (2007); Kim and Shin (2007)).   
Another type of alternative finance is provided by various forms of private credit agencies, 
and they provide an important source of seed capital for firms in the Hybrid Sector in China (AQQ 
2005).  Anecdotal evidence from Tsai (2006) illustrates that these informal institutions take on 
many forms in China, from shareholding cooperative enterprises run by professional money 
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brokers, lenders and middlemen, to credit associations operated by a group of entrepreneurs (raising 
money from group members and from outsiders to fund firms), from pawnshops to underground 
private money houses.  Further empirical studies based on surveys can examine the importance of 
these institutions and the exact mechanisms behind their business operations and risk 
management.20  Our theory also indicates that excessive regulation of these institutions may be 
counter-productive in emerging markets as many start-up firms do not have access to formal 
financial institutions.  
Finally, our theory also sheds some light on the comparison of shareholder-based corporate 
governance system among listed firms in the US, UK and other common-law countries, vs. 
stakeholder-based governance used in many other countries.  The effectiveness of shareholder-
based system depends crucially on the law and legal institutions, while a governance system that 
includes non-shareholder stakeholders, such as employees, business partners, customers and local 
communities, can be more effective, especially in environments of weak laws and formal legal 
institutions.  Hence, the prediction is that in most emerging countries firms and corporate sectors 
with strong stakeholder-based governance mechanisms are more likely to succeed.   
Allen and Gale (2000) build on Aoki’s seminal work on Japanese firms (see Aoki,1990, for 
a survey of this literature).  They develop an overlapping generations model of employees where 
firms hire both young and old workers.  All the employees and managers of the firm must reach 
consensus and cooperate for the firm to run efficiently.  The necessity of this consensus and 
cooperation can provide incentives for the provision of effort.  There is mutual monitoring that 
forms the foundation of ensuring neither group shirks.  By choosing strategies that attract young 
employees, the senior managers ensure that the long-run viability of the firms is maintained and all 
employees and shareholders do well.  They show that a broader focus on stakeholders leads to a 
                                                 
20 There is a strand of literature studying microfinance institutions and their importance in underdeveloped countries.  
See Morduch 1999 and Haley and Morduch 2002 for a review of existing microfinance programs, theoretical prediction 
and its empirical impact.   
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Pareto improvement in the allocation of resources.  The mutual monitoring mechanism inherent in 
this approach does not require legal mechanisms and is therefore different from the standard 
maximization of shareholder value approach.  This is based on the fiduciary duty of shareholders to 
managers and the protection of minority shareholders through legal mechanisms.21 
V.2 Policy Implications         
Our ultimate goal is to help design the optimal combination of legal and alternative 
institutions that best suit a country’s needs, and it is not our intention to downplay the importance of 
the role of the law and legal system in finance and commerce.  To this end we have concluded that 
legal mechanisms are an important part of developed economies’ institutions, providing stability 
and strong long-term incentives.  This conclusion is based on the premise that there are infrequent 
shocks to the economy that cause fundamental changes in ways that business is conducted, and that 
the legal system allows full access by all and promises fair resolution of disputes and enforces the 
rules uniformly.  However, the assumptions making legal institutions the optimal system in 
developed countries are unlikely to hold in many emerging economies.  A fast-growing economy is 
characterized by frequent shocks to the fundamentals of the economy, which make repeated 
changes to the practice of finance and commerce a requirement, not a choice.  Given that it typically 
takes years to build a well-functioning legal system and other formal institutions, the fixed costs of 
using the legal system can be quite high in a dynamic economy, even if the system provides fairness 
and expertise when dealing with changes in the law.  A much more severe problem with the legal 
system, perhaps, is the political economy factor.  It would be much easier for interest groups to 
capture the legal system in a country with underdeveloped institutions than in a country with 
developed institutions.  As a result, an economy relying on law and legal institutions as the sole 
                                                 
21 Also see Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2011) for a model of internal governance where self-serving actions of top 
management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. This type of internal governance can mitigate agency 
problems and ensure that firms have substantial value even in the absence of little or no external governance. 
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basis for commerce may find that such reliance is, in fact, a barrier to change and innovation. 
Therefore, we argue that alternative mechanisms play a much more prominent role in 
emerging economies and can actually be superior to legal mechanisms in supporting business 
transactions in certain industries or entire economies.  Our main policy implication is that in 
emerging economies, alternative dispute resolution and contract enforcement mechanisms should be 
encouraged and developed alongside the development of legal and other formal institutions.  In 
particular, measures that help foster competition and reduce entry barriers are welfare enhancing. 
The coexistence of and competition between alternative and legal mechanisms can also exert 
positive impact on the development of legal institutions, so that they are less likely to be captured 
by interest groups and become more efficient in adapting to changes.22  Whether and how a 
transition from a system dominated by alternative mechanisms to one using the law and legal 
institutions as the focal point depends on the country’s economic history and growth potential, as 
well as the workings of many other social and cultural factors that help build the social norms in the 
society and business communities. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Our starting premise is that the spectacular economic growth in Asian economies such as 
China, South Korea and Taiwan over the past five decades cannot be explained by most of the 
existing research on law, institutions, finance, and growth.  In these economies the legal system is 
underdeveloped and of limited use in finance and commerce.  During these economies’ fast-
growing periods, many firms do not rely on financial markets or banks to raise funds, and the 
government is autocratic and corrupt.  A review of economic history also shows that similar 
                                                 
22 Qian and Weingast (1997) argue that government decentralization since 1979 has helped foster competition among 
local officials and preserve market incentives in China. Allen and Qian (2008) argue that competition among officials 
from different regions curtails the negative impact of corruption on economic growth in China. 
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alternative institutions are important forces during the fast-growing periods of traditional 
industrialized nations such as the UK, Japan, and Germany.    
In our view these economic success stories contain important lessons that are not well 
understood by economists.  While using the law in finance and commerce has become a widely 
accepted idea, especially in the West, it is based on the history of institutional development in the 
same region.  We have argued that it can be optimal in static environments with infrequent changes.  
In dynamic environments such as China and India today or Taiwan and Korea twenty years ago it 
may be better to use other mechanisms that do not rely on the law because this reduces the 
inefficiencies associated with political economy factors.  Moreover, in a dynamic environment 
alternative institutions can adapt and change much more quickly than when the law is used, as this 
process does not require persuading the legislature and the electorate to revise the law.  Therefore, 
designing economic institutions that minimize political economy problems by not relying on the 
legal system is one of the keys to fast economic growth.  We conclude that in fast-growing 
economies and during early stages of economic growth, efficient alternative institutions are the 
main driver for finance, commerce and growth.  In both static and dynamic environments, viable 
alternative institutions and competition among different types of institutions remain keys to 
ensuring that the most efficient mechanism prevails and sustaining long-term growth.   
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Table 1 The Largest 25 Economies in the World: GDP and Growth 
 
GDP in 2010 (simple  GDP in 2010 GDP growth:  GDP per capita  in 2010 Per capita GDP growth
exchange rates) (PPP) 1990-2010*  (PPP)  1990-2010*  
    (constant prices)   (Constant Prices) 
Rank Country US$ Country Int’l $ 
billion 
Country Annual 
growth 
 Country Int’l  
$ unit 
Country Annual 
growth /Region  Billion /Region  /Region /Region /Region 
1 United States 14,658  United States 14,256 China 10.5%  United States 47,284 China 9.6%
2 China 5,878  China 8,765 Vietnam 7.4%  Netherlands 40,765 Vietnam 5.9%
3 Japan 5,459  Japan 4,159 India 6.5%  Australia 39,699 India 4.7%
4 Germany 3,316  India 3,526 Angola 6.1%  Canada 39,057 S. Korea 4.6%
5 France 2,583  Germany 2,806 Sudan 5.9%  Belgium 36,100 Taiwan  4.3%
6 U.K. 2,247  Russia 2,139 Malaysia 5.8%  Germany 36,033 Poland 3.8%
7 Brazil 2,090  U.K. 2,110 Bangladesh 5.4%  Taiwan  35,227 Thailand 3.7%
8 Italy 2,055  Brazil 2,108 Nigeria 5.3%  U.K. 34,920 Chile 3.7%
9 Canada 1,574  France 2,013 S. Korea 5.3%  France 34,077 Bangladesh 3.5%
10 India 1,538  Italy 1,740 Chile 5.1%  Japan 33,805 Malaysia 3.5%
11 Russia 1,465  Mexico 1,466 Taiwan 5.0%  S. Korea 29,836 Peru 3.2%
12 Spain 1,410  S. Korea 1,364 Peru 4.8%  Spain 29,742 Indonesia  3.2%
13 Australia 1,236  Spain 1,361 Egypt 4.6%  Israel 29,531 Argentina 3.1%
14 Mexico 1,039  Canada 1,281 Syria  4.6%  Italy 29,392 Egypt 2.5%
15 S. Korea 1,007  Indonesia 962 Indonesia 4.6%  Greece 28,434 Iran 2.4%
16 Netherlands 783  Turkey 880 Thailand 4.4%  Czech 24,869 Turkey 2.2%
17 Turkey 742  Australia 851 Pakistan 4.3%  Saudi Arabia 23,825 Pakistan 2.0%
18 Indonesia 707  Taiwan  828 Argentina 4.3%  Portugal 23,223 Australia 2.0%
19 Poland 469  Iran 736 Iran 4.0%  Poland 18,936 Columbia 1.9%
20 Belgium 466  Poland 689 Philippines 3.7%  Hungary 18,738 Syria 1.9%
   21 Saudi Arabia 444  Netherlands 659 Poland 3.8% Argentina 15,854 Israel 1.9%
22 Taiwan  431  Argentina 594 Turkey 3.7% Russia 15,837 Greece 1.9%
23 Austria 377  Saudi Arabia 583 Colombia 3.4% Chile 15,002 Philippines 1.7%
24 Argentina 370 Thailand 539 Australia 3.3% Malaysia 14,670 Romania 1.7%
25 South Africa 357 South Africa 504 Brazil 3.1% ! Mexico 14,430 Netherlands 1.7%
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database April 2011 
Notes: Countries with population less than 10 million, GDP less than US$ 50 billion in 2010, or less than 15 years of GDP observations are excluded from the rankings. 
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Figure 1  Per Capita GDP (in PPP terms) Growth in China, Taiwan and S. Korea 
 
This figure compares growth in per capita GDP (in PPP terms; inflation adjusted) in Taiwan and 
Korea during 1960-2006 and China during the period of 1980-2006 (so that the first year for China 
corresponds to growth between 1980 and 1981). Data source is the website of A. Maddison 
(http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Comparing Payments Systems in Developed Countries 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, “Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected 
Countries,” March 2006, www.bis.org/publ.  
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